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Land and wealth are closely related in rural Brazil, a country characterized by high 
levels of inequality in terms of income or landholdings. After presenting a historical 
retrospective of land concentration and land reform in Brazil, this study evaluates the 
impact of the land reform programme undertaken in the 1990s on land ownership and 
land distribution. It is shown that the programme increased landownership among poor 
rural families and those with less educated household heads, reducing the fraction of the 
other families with landholding. Also, the land reform programme increased land 
inequality among landowners. 
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In Brazil, wealth has been largely associated with land. From the very beginning of the 
colonization, only 30 years after the discovery, the Portuguese Crown divided the huge 
territory in 15 large tracts of land which were donated to grantees with hereditary 
succession. Today, Brazil has one of the most skewed land distributions in the world 
and, not surprisingly, it is one of the most unequal countries in terms of the income 
distribution. Facing the challenge of reducing inequality of land ownership and 
intensifying land use, the Brazilian government implemented a land reform programme 
in 1966, with the enactment of the Land Act. Since its creation, there are important 
differences in the implementation of the programme through time and space. 
 
This study studies the structure of land ownership and land distribution in Brazil, 
investigating the consequences of the land reform programme implemented in the 
1990s. The empirical strategy is based on the use of time and space variation of the land 
reform programme as a means of identifying a causal relationship of land reform on 
land ownership and inequality. This strategy is implemented with household-level data 
from the National Household Survey (PNAD), covering the period from 1992-2002 
(except 1994 and 2000), and land disappropriations published by the Brazilian Institute 
for Land Reform (INCRA). 
 
The main findings of the study are the following. The investigation of the effect of the 
land reform on landownership suggests that (i) there is no increase on the access to land 
of the typical Brazilian rural household; and (ii) the effect is differentiated with respect 
to household income and the educational level of the household head—there is an 
increase in land ownership of poorest households and those with the least educated 
heads, and a decrease for the other classes of rural households. Concentrating on the 
families with landholdings, the analysis of the land reform effect on the distribution of 
land provides evidence of an increase of the land inequality. This result is obtained both 
with the decomposition of the effect of land reform into household income groups and 
with the quantile regression analysis. Land reform seems to reduce the size of small 
landowners (poor households) and increase the size of those above the median (richer 
households). 
 
These results contribute for a better understanding of the impact of redistributive land 
reform in Latin America. Although there is a vast literature addressing land reform and 
agrarian organization, there is little evidence about the Latin American experience 
(Binswanger and Deininger 1997; Carter and Zegarra 2000; and Deininger and Feder 
2000). Although some authors, such as Conning (2001) and Conning and Robinson 
(2001), have constructed models that exhibit features often observed in Latin America 
to analyze agrarian organization and land reform, most of the literature considers 2 
general aspects or case studies from Asia (Grossman 1994; Horowitz 1993; Besley and 
Burgess 2000; and Banerjee et al. 2002). 
 
The study is presented in six sections. Section 1 presents the historical determinants of 
land concentration in Brazil. Section 2 describes the institutional background regarding 
the Brazilian land reform programme. Data is depicted in Section 3. Section 4 
investigates the correlation between land and wealth indicators. Sections 5 and 6 
evaluate the impact of the land reform on land ownership and land inequality, 
respectively. Then, a summary of the results and final remarks are presented in the 
conclusion section. 
2  Historical determinants of the land distribution and land access in Brazil 
2.1  Early determinants of the land concentration 
The highly concentrated Brazilian land distribution is deeply rooted in the colonization 
process. In the 1530s, inspired by the success of land settlements in the Madeira Islands, 
Portugal’s King João III divided Brazil into 15 territories called capitanias hereditárias 
(hereditary captaincies)—areas donated to Portuguese grantees (captains) with 
hereditary succession. Each captain had complete authority over his land. However, due 
to a series of obstacles, only a few capitanias have succeeded, and six of the captains 
never took possession of their claims (Bueno 1999). 
 
Another wave of settlements occurred in the seventeenth century, with the increase of 
the global demand for sugar. In another land concentrating initiative, the crown offered 
large tracts of land (sesmarias) in order to encourage settlement and production. The 
holders of sesmarias experienced complete property rights over their holdings whenever 
land was kept under cultivation. It is worth noting that such a condition regarding land 
use remained throughout Brazil’s history and was reassured in the constitution of 1988. 
The sesmaria system finished in 1822 with the Brazilian independence (Alston and 
Mueller 2003). 
 
From 1822 to 1850, no land policy took place and settlers obtained land by squatting, 
enforcing their claims by social norms. In 1850, the landowners of the coffee 
plantations passed the Land Act, which set the pattern for modern landholding. The 
Land Act of 1850 forbade the colonial practice of obtaining land through squatting, 
limiting the acquisition to purchase. All existing squatters were legalized and, 
surprisingly, all sesmarias were revalidated (Alston and Mueller 2003). Concentration 
of land was the rule and the great majority of the people (especially after the 1888 
abolition of slavery) were forced to work on large plantations and farms without any 
hope of acquiring a small farm of their own. 3 
2.2  Modern determinants of land concentration 
In addition to the heritage from the colonial period, the macroeconomic environment in 
the last 40 years has played a key role as a determinant of land distribution in Brazil. 
The following analysis considers landholdings as hedge against inflation and 
macroeconomic instabilities, both of which tend to set a wedge between the price of 
land and the capitalized value of the income stream generated from agriculture. 
Especially in periods of high macroeconomic instability, people demand land as a 
mechanism of protection against aggregate uncertainty. Assunção (2005) argues that 
this feature, coupled with imperfections in the land rental market, leads to an inefficient 
high concentration of landholdings. The existence of a non-agricultural component in 
the demand for land can be identified through the comparison between land prices and 
rental rates of croplands and pastures. The empirical strategy is based on the fact that 
while an increase on macroeconomic instability raises the land prices, the same is less 
likely to occur with the rental rates. 
 
The empirical test is based on a sequence of policies adopted to contain the inflationary 
process during the 1980s and 1990s. Those heterodox policies have resulted in 
unexpected (and exogenous, from the point of view of agricultural producers) increases 
in the uncertainty of the economy, led by notions concerning inertial inflation. The 
implementation of economic plans aimed specifically at containing inflationary inertia 
through a set of measures including the deindexation of the economy, temporary price 
freezes, and a freeze on financial assets to reduce the economy’s liquidity and generate 
resources for the budget. The uncertainty introduced into the economy by those drastic 
measures generated a large shift in the demand for safe assets, including land. 
 
The non-agricultural component of land demand, as mentioned above, is identified by 
comparing the effects of the implementation of such policies on the land prices for sale 
and rental. Two dummy variables were built; one indicating the introduction of a new 
economic plan in the current semester, and another one related to the institution of an 
economic plan in the previous semester. The following plans are considered: Cruzado 
Plan (February 1986), Bresser Plan (June 1987), Summer Plan (January 1989), Collor 
Plan (April 1990) and Real Plan (June 1994). 
 
Regressions for the whole Brazilian sample were estimated and reported in Table 1. The 
dependent variables were detrended by using the Hodrick-Prescott filter and centered 
around the original mean. Therefore, the intercept of each regression can be interpreted 
as the average land price in the absence of new economic plans in the current and 
previous semester. The coefficients of the dummy variables represent the average 
changes in prices at the implementation of the economic plans and in the subsequent 
semester. The data consist of semi-annual observations of land prices for sale and rental 
covering the period 1966-2000. They are collected by the Getúlio Vargas Foundation, 
which gathers information from more than 3,600 local agencies scattered among many 4 
Brazilian districts. Observations refer to actual transactions, collected within the 
districts at the end of each semester. 
Table 1: Effect of Brazilian economic plans on land prices and rental rates, 1966-2000 
   Pastures  Cropland 
Estimates sale  rental  sale  rental 
1520.1 118.2  2643.8  196.4  (A) Constant 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
591.1 24 877.8  11.1  (B) Dummy variable: new economic plan in 
the current semester  (0.012)  (0.005) (0.018) (0.298) 
(B) / (A) %  38.90  20.30  33.20  5.70 
733.1 19.2  1095.1  2.85  (C) Dummy variable: new economic plan in 
the previous semester  (0.002)  (0.022) (0.004) (0.788) 
(C) / (A) %  48.20  16.20  41.40  1.50 
Observations  69  69 69 69 
R-squared  0.17  0.14 0.15 0.02 
Source: Assunção (2005). 
 
Table 1 shows that the economic plans promoted significant increases in land prices for 
sales of both meadows and cropland in the current and next semester, accounting for 
more than 15 per cent of the total variability of these variables from 1966 to 2000. The 
effects upon rental rates are much smaller and statistically insignificant for cropland. 
This suggests that the response of land prices for sale to an exogenous increase in 
macroeconomic instability is larger compared with rental rates, which is consistent with 
the existence of a non-agricultural purpose of landholding. For pastures, the economic 
plans have determined an increase of almost 40 per cent in land prices of sales in the 
current semester and up to 50 per cent in the next one. The rental rates have experienced 
a much lower increase, around 20 per cent. For cropland, Table 1 shows significant 
increments only for land prices, both in the current and subsequent semesters. The 
difference between meadows and cropland might be a result of the demand for livestock 
as another source of hedge. 
2.3  Latin American land markets 
In order to put the Brazilian case in a more general perspective, this section presents 
some evidence on the organization of agriculture sector in Latin American countries. 
Land markets in Latin America present two distinguishing types of imperfections 
(Deininger and Feder 2000). First, land is used not only as a productive asset but also as 
a source of other benefits; as a hedge against inflation, as an asset that can be liquidated 
to smooth consumption in the face of risk, as collateral for access to loans, as a tax 
shelter, or as a means of laundering illicit funds (de Janvry et al. 1997). Second, land 
rental markets in Latin America are underdeveloped. A large body of literature has been 
t
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theoretically addressing the reasons for the imperfections in the land rental market.1 
Many reasons provide explanations for a reduction in the share of output appropriated 
by the tenants. Specifically, a factor that is likely to be important in most Latin 
American countries is the landlord’s fear of loss of the land (Macours et al. 2001). 
 
Table 2 compares several indicators of Latin America with Asia, Europe and the United 
States. Overall, Latin American countries combine a highly skewed distribution of land 
with the predominance of owner or owner-like form of land tenure, and agricultural land 
is mostly represented by meadows and pastures, remaining under exploited. 
Table 2: International Indicators  
Indicators  Latin America  Asia  Europe  United States 
Number of holdings  10,281,607 143,934,358  7,625,520 1,911,859 
Total area (ha.)  705,586,803  268,741,639 125,394,061 377,088,222 
Average farm size  68.6  1.9  16.4  197.2 
Land Gini coefficient  0.83  0.52  0.64  0.75 
Agricultural land %  65.70  91.80  70.60  88.90 
  cropland %  20.40  99.50  65.60  52.10 
  meadows/pastures % 79.60  0.50  34.40  47.90 
Land  tenure  (area)       
  owner/owner-like %  85.50  88.70  61.40  33.90 
  rented from other %  3.60  2.80  23.30  11.60 
  mixed/others %  10.70  8.50  15.30  54.50 
Below  10      
  farms %  58.70  97.40  74.50  29.50 
  area %  2.50  72.60  11.40  1.20 
Notes: Latin America—Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto 
Rico, Uruguay, Venezuela; Asia—Bangladesh, Cyprus, India, Iran, Japan, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Thailand, Turkey; Europe—Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom.  
Source: FAO (1990, 2000). 
 
This regularity can be explained by the absence of a land rental market and non-
agricultural purposes for landholding (Assunção 2005). Imperfections in rental market 
are reflected in 85 per cent of the total area operating under owner or owner-like forms, 
                                                 
1 The basic arguments are: risk-sharing (Cheung 1969); hidden actions and moral hazard (Stiglitz 1974; 
Ghatak and Pandey 2000; Eswaran and Kotwal 1985); screening (Hallagan 1978; Allen 1982); and 
limited liability constraints (Shetty 1988; Laffont and Matoussi 1995). 6 
most of which are constituted by large landholdings. In contrast, 58.7 per cent of the 
farms have less than 10 hectares. In addition to the inverse relationship between farm 
size and productivity (Berry and Cline 1979; Feder 1985), this evidence indicates that 
even with low productivity, large landowners neither lease out nor sell their plots. They 
do not lease them out because the rental market has many imperfections. And since they 
obtain non-agricultural payoffs as a result of land titles, they are not willing to sell them. 
This conjugation makes Latin American agriculture unique, and the fact that only one-
fifth of the agricultural land is not covered by pastures and meadows may be an 
indication of an inefficient organization of production, with significant welfare 
implications. 
 
Although Asian countries, for the most part, exhibit the same tenure structure, they have 
a much more egalitarian distribution of land and a significantly smaller average farm 
size. There is no evidence of a missing rental market since it seems that there is no 
demand for it. The predominance of cropland indicates the high intensity of land use. 
The situation in European countries is similar but less evident. The rental market works, 
and only two-thirds of the area is operated by owner or owner-like forms. As in Latin 
American countries, the United States exhibits a concentrated land distribution, and the 
average plot size is large. However, only one-third of the area is under owner or owner-
like form of tenure, and less than 30 per cent of the farms have less than 10 hectares. As 
a result, 52.1 per cent of agricultural land comprise crop. 
3  Brazilian land reform 
3.1  A brief history 
A part of land reform history in Brazil begins with the Land Act of 1964, brought about 
by the military regime. The long and comprehensive text constituted detailed proposals 
for agrarian reform. The law created the Brazilian Institute for Agrarian Reform (IBRA) 
and the National Institute for Agricultural Development (INDA) in order to carry out 
the Act. In 1971, IBRA and INDA were merged into the National Institute for Rural 
Settlement and Agrarian Reform (INCRA). The Act was a means of dissuading the 
pressure for land redistribution of social movements, especially the ‘peasant leagues’ 
and the emerging activism of Catholic priests. The political context in Latin America in 
early 1960s was characterized by peasant militancies and threats of agrarian rebellions. 
However, instead of distributing property, the economic strategy of the military regime 
aimed at the modernization of the large landholders by means of subsidized rural credit. 
Soybean cultivation—the main target of the rural policies—generated large surpluses 
for export and, simultaneously, resulted in the absorption of small farmers by medium- 
and large-sized properties, concentrating the land distribution. 
 
With the return of democracy in 1985, the first National Agrarian Reform Plan (1985-
89) was prepared and launched, establishing the unrealistic target of settling 1.4 million 7 
families in five years. But, as shown in Table 3, Sarney’s government disappropriated 
less than 5 millions of hectares, slightly more than 10 percent of the initial proposal. On 
the other hand, Sarney’s government determined the first of two significant waves of 
disappropriations in the recent Brazilian history, as shown in Figures 1 and 2. 













































































































































South Southeast Central-West Northeast North Brazil
 
 
In the following Collor government the programme came to a halt—only 15,065 
hectares were disappropriated. With the impeachment of Collor and the substitution of 
the president, the land reform process was resumed and more than 20,000 families were 
settled in almost 1.5 million hectares. During his first run of office (1995-98), President 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso accelerated the rhythm of the settlements. As shown in 
Table 3, more than 7.5 millions hectares were disappropriated in the period.2 Figures 1 
and 2 shows that the disappropriation wave undertaken in Cardoso’s administration is 
substantially different from the disappropriations which occurred during the Sarney 
government. While the disappropriated area in each year of the two governments are 
comparable, the number of processes established in the Cardoso’s is much higher, 
suggesting that the settlements were more decentralized through the Brazilian 
territories. The period was also characterized by conflicts and land invasions, mostly 
associated with the Landless Workers’ Movement, which is the largest social movement 
                                                 
2 The official report indicates that the first Cardoso’s government settled landless households on 12 
million hectares. On the other hand, the data on disappropriation process from INCRA indicates 7.5 
million hectares. The difference of 4.5 million hectares (37 per cent) may be due to settlements on public 
lands or even to errors in the computation of the 12 million hectares. 8 
in Latin America with more than a 1.5 million members. In the second run of Cardoso’s 
administration the focus of land reform changed from the disappropriation model to a 
new form of ‘negotiated land reform’ (Deininger 1998). 
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Figure 3 shows the spatial distribution of the disappropriations during the Cardoso 
period. The process is clearly heterogeneous, restricted to sub-regions of the country. In 
other to focus our analysis on the areas where the process was more concentrated, a sub-
sample of selected Brazilian States is built. This study evaluates the consequences of 
this modern wave of land redistribution based on disappropriations, covering the period 
1992-2002 and corresponding to the governments of Itamar Franco and Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso. 
3.2  Land disappropriation: procedures and costs 
Introduced by the Land Act, the land disappropriation legislation was significantly 
changed by Brazil’s 1988 Constitution. Since then, only unproductive land is under the 
risk of disappropriation for which the state needs to pay a ‘fair price’. After the 1993 
amendment, the ‘fair price’ became the ‘market price’. Therefore, at the same time there 
is a permit of confiscation, the government needs to pay the market price which, in 
principle, is determined by buyers and sellers rather than anything else.  9 
Table 3: Brazilian land reform expropriation processes from 1979 to 2003 
  
Brazil North  Region  Northeast  Region 
Central-West 





























131 2,845,029 21  1,503,700  34  488,966 26  532,296 11  47,557  39  272,510 
José Sarney  
(Mar/1985 to 
Mar/1990) 
701 4,811,507 128 1,789,716  258  1,276,426 89  1,290,367 85  281,368  141  173,630 
Fernando Collor de 
Mello (Mar/1990 to 
Oct/1992) 
7 15,065  2 5,550 0  0  3  3,041  1 3,584  1 2,890 
Itamar Franco 
(Oct/1992 to Jan/1995) 
245 1,365,263 36  402,473 113  476,309  48  419,772  15  30,746  33  35,962 
Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso I 
(Jan/1995 to Jan/1999) 
2,323 7,561,048 358  2,181,950 999  2,260,640 431  2,414,377 253  442,025  282  262,056 
Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso II (Jan/1999 
to Jan/2003) 
1,265 2,785,296 186  511,376  633  1,175,412 189  775,182  156  249,238  101  74,089 
Source: INCRA (1999).  10 
Figure 3: Land disappropriation in Cardoso's government 
 
Source: National Institute for Rural Settlement and Agrarian Reform (INCRA). 
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This conceptual confusion in the legislation of disappropriation along with other 
institutional failures imposed high costs to the land reform. According to INCRA 
(1999), the final cost stipulated by the judicial system in the end of a disappropriation 
process is, on average, five times the initial evaluation. In the southeastern part of the 
country the averaged multiplier was 14. Reydon (2000) describes eight necessary steps 
of the disappropriation process. The process begins with an act signed by the Brazilian 
president and finish, usually, with a judicial decision. There are three issues addressed 
in the judicial demands: the items to be compensated, the amount of the indemnity, and 
the form of payment (public bonds versus cash). 
4 Data 
The following analysis is based on combined data from two sources. The first one, is the 
database on the disappropriation processes publicly available in the INCRA’s website.3 
The data comprises the date, farm’s name, area, and municipality of each approved 
process of land disappropriation since 1979. The second source of information is the 
National Household Surveys (PNAD), collected annually4 since 1981 by the Brazilian 
Census Bureau (IBGE). Since 1992, the PNAD survey provides information on 
landholdings and, therefore, the period considered in the analysis is 1992 to 2002. The 
sample consists in all rural households available in the PNAD survey, from 1992 to 
2002. The information across years refers to repeated cross-sections. It is not possible to 
form a panel with PNAD data. 
 
For each household, there is information on landholdings, household head 
characteristics, spouse characteristics and household characteristics. Since the PNAD 
survey is representative at the state level, the information of each household is 
combined with information on land disappropriation in the corresponding state in the 
previous year. It is assumed, implicitly, that settlements take about one year after the 
disappropriation to be established. The results are robust to the use of different lags of 
the information about land reform. Actually, the disappropriation in the current year is 
very correlated with disappropriation in the previous year or two years before. 
 
Table 4 reports all the variables considered in the analysis. We consider two main 
dependent variables: a binary variable indicating whether the household is landowner or 
not, and the logarithm of landholding area. On average, 39 per cent of all 131,775 
observations in the sample hold a positive amount of land. The average farm size is 41 
hectares for those with landholdings.5 The main independent variables in this study are 
those with information on land reform. There are two variables measuring land 
disappropriation in the state in the previous year. The first one is a dummy variable 
                                                 
3 www.incra.gov.br. 
4 Except for the years of 1991, 1994 and 2000. 
5 If we include the households with no land, the average becomes 16.6 hectares as shown in Table 4. 12 
indicating whether or not there was any disappropriation in the state, until the previous 
year. More than 3/4 of the sample have at least one disappropriation process on their 
state. The second variable aims at capturing the intensity of the disappropriation, and it 
is defined as the ratio between the disappropriated area (measured in hectares) and the 
number of rural households of each state until the previous period. There are also three 
sets of control variables regarding characteristics of the household, household head and 
spouse. Summary statistics on all considered variables are depicted in Table 4. 
Table 4: Description of the variables 
Variables Obs  Mean  Std  Dev.  Min  Max 
Dummy (household with 
landholdings=1)  131775 0.3948473 0.48882  0  1 
Total area of the landholdings  131775  16.56629  149.48  0  10000 
log(total area of the landholdings)  52031  11.25869  1.72691  0  18 
Dummy (positive disappropriation 
until the previous year=1) 
131775 0.7775223 0.41591  0  1 
Disappropriated area per rural 
household in the state until the 
previous year 
102458 0.0001445 0.00034  0  2.56E-03 
Log (disappropriated area per rural 
household until the previous year) 
102458 -9.85296  1.27841  -13.554 -5.967 
Household head characteristics           
Gender 131775  0.8706887 0.33555  0  1 
Age 131757  46.59258  16.0858  10  106 
Years of schooling  131589  3.44639  2.95841  1  16 
Dummy (employer=1)  115555  0.0461598 0.20983  0  1 
Dummy (employee=1)  115555  0.4219116 0.49387  0  1 
Dummy (self-employed=1)  115555  0.4730648 0.49928  0  1 
Income 128465  417.0069  833.528  0.000  43032.780 
Spouse  characteristics         
Dummy (spouse is present =1)  131775  0.7849972 0.41083  0  1 
Gender 103443  0.013727  0.16513  0  1 
Age 103429  39.84355  14.4284  11  98 
Years of schooling  103179  4.053121  3.06749  1  16 
Income 103111  83.39452  277.456  0  22258 
Number of household members  131775  4.140178  2.1597  1  24 
Number of members above 60 years 
old 
131775 0.3645987 0.65412  0  6 
Number of members under 10 years 
old 
131775 1.073899 1.29223  0  10 
 13 
Household  characteristics        
Per capita income  127691  174.228  348.246  0  16749 
Dummy (lives on own land=1)  92928  0.8836949 0.32059  0  1 
Dummy (access to piped water=1)  131274  0.472226  0.49923  0  1 
Dummy (house with bathroom=1)  131271  0.6342223 0.48165  0  1 
Dummy (access to electricity=1)  131267  0.6907905 0.46217  0  1 
Dummy (has water filter=1)  131265  0.4307774 0.49519  0  1 
Dummy (has colour TV=1)  131271  0.3636523 0.48105  0  1 
Dummy (has refrigerator=1)  131255  0.4637538 0.49869  0  1 
Source: IBGE, National Household Surveys (PNAD) (various). 





landholdings 1%  5%  10%  25% 50% 75% 90%  95% 99% 
1992 44.2  0.3  0.6  1.0  2.0 7.3 24.2  68.0 137.9 565.0 
1993 42.7  0.3  0.7  1.0  2.1 7.3 24.2  62.9 121.0 484.0 
1995 42.7  0.3  0.6  0.9  2.0 6.1 24.0  62.0 121.0 615.0 
1996 39.6  0.2  0.6  0.9  2.0 6.0 21.8  67.0 121.0 470.0 
1997 40.4  0.3  0.6  0.9  2.0 6.1 22.0  60.5 120.0 426.6 
1998 38.4  0.3  0.6  0.9  2.0 6.1 23.0  60.0 106.5 366.0 
1999 39.2  0.3  0.6  1.0  2.0 6.0 20.0  58.1 111.3 423.5 
2001 42.0  0.1  0.6  1.0  2.0 7.0 24.2  62.0 120.0 484.0 
2002 42.2  0.2  0.6  1.0  2.0 7.0 24.2  60.0 106.5 380.0 
Source: IBGE, National Household Surveys (PNAD) (various). 
 
Table 5 presents the evolution of the percentage of households with landholdings and 
the land distribution of the households with positive area. There is no clear trend neither 
in the proportion of landowner households nor in landholding distribution. Table 6 
reports the evolution of the per capita household income for the period under analysis. 
The only clear pattern depicted in Table 6 is that income inequality is lower when we 
restrict the income distribution to the households with land. 
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Table 6: Distribution of the per capita household income 
   All households  Only households with landholdings 
Year 25%  50%  75%  90%  95% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 
1992  40  84  172 314 457  42  87  169 278 402 
1993  40  89  194 373 599  43  92  183 304 474 
1995  46  93  185 348 522  54  104 186 328 491 
1996  46  98  194 356 531  53  104 184 338 516 
1997  45  93  185 346 544  53  104 180 341 498 
1998  46  93  187 331 501  58  108 187 345 514 
1999  49  98  190 339 516  57  109 188 344 514 
2001  48  103 215 367 574  54  107 207 337 478 
2002  50  100 200 330 480  55  103 200 320 455 
Source: IBGE, National Household Surveys (PNAD) (various). 
 
5  Wealth and land 
This section assesses the relationship between land and wealth indicators in Brazil. 
Since there is no information on personal assets, the focus is restricted to an 
approximation of the household wealth. This approximation is comprised by three 
components. The first component is the per capita household income. Under imperfect 
credit markets, household’s expected income is an increasing function of wealth 
(Banerjee and Newman 1993; Galor and Zeira 1993). Thus, information on the total 
household income reflects, to some extent, information on family wealth. The first 
column of Table 7 presents a regression of the logarithm of household landholdings on 
the logarithm of per capita income. The estimated coefficient suggests a very tight 
relationship between income and land, statistically significant at 1 per cent. In the next 
two columns, Table 7 shows the relationship between land and other components of 
household wealth. The second wealth component is consisted by durable goods: water 
filter, colour TV and refrigerator. And the third wealth component on which there is 
information in the PNAD survey is related to the value of the houses and, in particular, 
to the housing infrastructure. The underlying assumption of this exercise is that 
wealthier families lives in better equipped houses, both in terms of durable goods and in 
terms of infrastructure. 
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Table 7: The relationship between wealth indicators and landholding 
Dependent variable: log (area of the household landholdings)     
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
log(per capita income)  0.569***  0.460***  0.400***  0.317*** 
 (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.012) 
Dummy (has water filter=1)     0.293***  0.270***  0.165*** 
     (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Dummy (has colour TV=1)     0.067***  0.095***  -0.021 
     (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.020) 
Dummy (has refrigerator=1)     0.462***  0.422***  0.244*** 
     (0.018)  (0.022)  (0.023) 
Dummy (access to piped 
water=1)       0.508***  0.402*** 
       (0.021)  (0.022) 
Dummy (house with 
bathroom=1)       0.299***  0.212*** 
       (0.019)  (0.020) 
Dummy (access to electricity=1)       -0.620***  -0.570*** 
       (0.020)  (0.021) 
Household head characteristics  No  No  No  Yes 
Spouse characteristics  No  No  No  Yes 
Household characteristics  No  No  No  Yes 
Constant 8.879***  9.070***  9.319***  7.409*** 
   (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.217) 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 48957  48860  48859  40860 
R-squared 0.13  0.16  0.19  0.26 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
Source: IBGE, National Household Surveys (PNAD) (various). 
 
Column (2) of Table 7 reports that the presence of all durable goods are highly 
correlated with land. Moreover, when information on durable goods are incorporated in 
the regression, the coefficient of income is reduced from 0.569 to 0.460. This is 
evidence that income in column (1) reflects part of the household wealth which is 
incorporated in column (2). The same seems to occur with the introduction of the 
information about infrastructure in column (3). The only exception is access to 
electricity, which has a statistically significant and negative coefficient. The results 
might reflect the fact that households with larger tracts of land are located in more 
isolated areas. In this case, access to electricity is more related to urbanization than to 
wealth. Finally in column (4), all available information about the characteristics of the 
household, head and spouse are introduced in the regression to control for observed 
heterogeneity. Even after controlling for all these characteristics, land remains highly 
correlated to the three wealth components: per capita income, durable goods and 16 
house’s infrastructure. Thus, the following analysis about the land distribution can be 
also interpreted as a study of the wealth distribution in Brazil. 
6  Land reform and land ownership 
This section estimates the impact of land reform on the fraction of the rural households 
with landholdings, through household-level data. The sample comprises all surveyed 
rural households, whether they hold a positive amount of land or not, for the period 
from 1992 to 2002. Households are pooled across years, i.e., households of different 
periods are considered as different households. The results are estimated considering the 
following linear probability model6: 
{} { } ( ) { } , 0 log 0   , | 0 Pr i i i i i i i X D I D D I X D L β γ α ′ + > ⋅ ⋅ + > ⋅ = >  (1) 
where  i L  stands for the total area owned by household i,  {} 0 > i D I  is a binary variable 
indicating whether or not there is disappropriation until the previous year in the State 
where household i lives,  (){ } 0 log > ⋅ i i D I D  is the logarithm of the disappropriated area 
per rural household in State with positive disappropriation until the previous year, and 
Xi is a vector of control variables including household head characteristics, spouse 
characteristics, household characteristics and year dummies. 
 
Under the assumption that, given the observed characteristics, the disappropriation until 
the previous year is not correlated with the unobserved determinants of landholding, 
parameters  α  and γ  measure the effect of land reform on the fraction of rural 
households with landholdings. Manipulating (1) it is possible to show that: 
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Thus, the parameter α  measures the effect of the first disappropriated hectare per rural 
household on the fraction of rural families with landholding, and the parameter α  
represents the effect of 1 per cent change in the disappropriated area per rural household 
on land ownership. Results from the estimation of Equation (1) are presented in Table 8, 
considering nested specifications for the vector of control variables. In column (1), 
which control only for the year dummies, the existence land disappropriation in the 
previous year has an effect of 31.7 percentage points on the fraction of households with 
land. The effect of 1 per cent of variation in the disappropriated area per rural household 
 
                                                 
6 For ease of notation, it is considered log(0)·0=0 in the interpretation of Equation (1). 17 
Table 8: Effect of land reform on the fraction of the rural population with landholdings 
Dependent variable: Dummy variable indicating whether the household own land     
Decomposition of the effect with respect to: 
Without controls  With controls  income age  schooling 
   (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
0.317*** 0.01  0.135***  0.089***  0.077*** 
Dummy (positive disappropriation until the previous year=1) 
(0.013) (0.014)  (0.024)  (0.030)  (0.020) 
     -0.104***  -0.076*  -0.043  Dummy (positive disappropriation) x dummy (2nd quintile) 
     (0.034)  (0.040)  (0.030) 
     -0.135***  -0.057  -0.141***  Dummy (positive disappropriation) x dummy (3rd quintile) 
     (0.037)  (0.040)  (0.029) 
     -0.243***  -0.117***    Dummy (positive disappropriation) x dummy (4th quintile) 
     (0.039)  (0.039)   
     -0.173***  -0.178***    Dummy (positive disappropriation) x ummy (5th quintile) 
      (0.038)  (0.041)    
0.031*** 0.002  0.013***  0.011***  0.007***  log(disappropriated area per rural household) 
(0.001) (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
     -0.010***  -0.009**  -0.002  log(disappropriated area per rural household) x dummy (2nd 
quintile) 
     (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
     -0.011***  -0.007*  -0.012***  log(disappropriated area per rural household) x dummy (3rd 
quintile) 
     (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
     -0.022***  -0.013***    log(disappropriated area per rural household) x dummy (4th 
quintile) 
     (0.004)  (0.004)   
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     -0.014***  -0.020***    log(disappropriated area per rural household) x dummy (5th 
quintile) 
     (0.004)  (0.004)   
Household head, spouse and household characteristics  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant 0.407***  -0.063***  -0.055***  -0.041***  -0.083*** 
   (0.003)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.012) 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 131775  63562  63562  63562  63562 
R-squared 0.00  0.59 0.60 0.59  0.59 
Notes: Terciles rather than quintiles were considered for the case of years of schooling due to the large proportion of heads with 1 year of schooling or less. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
Source: IBGE, National Household Surveys (PNAD) (various). 
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increases landholding in 3.1 percentage points. However, when the full set of control 
variables are introduced, column (2) shows that the effect vanishes. Thus, on average, 
results from columns (1) and (2) of the Table 8 suggest that land reform does not 
increase the proportion of rural families with landholdings. On the one hand, these 
results might be true in the sense that Brazilian experience with land reform does not 
increase the access to land. On the other hand, the estimated zero effect might be the 
result of countervailing effects. As shown in Section 2, the Brazilian land reform 
programme consists on redistributive transfers from large landowners to small farmers 
and landless peasants. Unimproved and large tracts of land are under the risk of 
expropriation, while small and productive farms cannot be taken. Consequently, the 
process by itself has differentiated effects on the rural households.  
 
In order to investigate possible differentiated effects, Table 8 presents estimates of 
Equation (1) in which the parameters α  and γ  are decomposed according to the 
household per capita income, age and years of schooling of the household head. For the 
cases of income and age, the sample was divided into quintiles and, for the case of 
schooling, it was considered terciles, due to the large number of heads with 1 year of 
schooling or less. The results reported in columns (3) to (5) suggest that the absence 
of the effect estimated in column (2) is the result of heterogeneity, related to income and 
education. Land reform increases the access to land of low income households and those 
with less educated head, considering both the occurrence of land reform () α  and its 
intensity () γ . 
 
Land disappropriation increases in 13.5 percentage points the fraction of the rural 
families with landholding, in the first quintile of the per capita income distribution, as 
depicted in column (3) of Table 8. To all other groups of income, the effect is 
substantially lower or even negative. The effect of the intensity of the land reform, 
which is measured by the disappropriated area per rural household, is also positive and 
statistically significant to low income households. A similar pattern is presented for the 
educational level of the household head in column (5). Only the lowest tercile, which 
corresponds to the household head with 1 year of schooling or less, is affected 
positively by the land reform. 
7  Land reform and land distribution 
The previous section investigates the effect of land reform on land ownership. Here, the 
analysis is restricted to landowner households, aiming at estimating the effect of the 
land reform on the land distribution. It is not possible to assert, a priori, whether a 
redistributive land reform in the way were implemented in Brazil increases or reduces 
the average landholding size. It depends on the relationship between the holdings 
affected and not affected by the reform. If the farm size of the beneficiaries is smaller 
than the average non-affected farm, land reform tend to reduce the typical farm size. On 20 
the other hand, if the confiscated farms are not the largest, it is possible to have an 
increase on the average post-reform landholdings. 
 
The empirical analysis which follows is presented in two steps. First, it is considered the 
effect on the average farm size. Then, quantile regressions are used to investigate the 
effect of the land reform on each decile of the land distribution. The first set of results 
considers the following linear specification7 focusing on the average landholding size: 
 
() () { } ( ) { } . 0 log 0 , | log i i i i i i i X D I D D I X D L E δ λ φ ′ + > ⋅ ⋅ + > ⋅ =   (4) 
 
Again, if the disappropriation until the previous year is not correlated with the 
unobserved determinants of landholding size, conditional on the observed variables  i X , 
the parameters φ  and λ  measure the effect of land reform on the fraction of rural 
households with landholdings. Simple computations with (1) show that: 
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Thus, the parameter φ  represents the percent change of the first disappropriated hectare 
per rural household on the size of the landholdings. The parameter λ  is the elasticity of 
the size of the landholdings with respect to the disappropriated area per rural household, 
for those States with positive disappropriation.  
 
Panel (i) of the Table 9 shows the estimates of Equation (4), considering different sets 
of control variables and decompositions. Column (1) suggests that land reform reduces 
the average farm size. However, controlling for all observed characteristics, the effect 
becomes positive. The first disappropriated hectare per household has an impact of 
increasing in 57.3 per cent the average farm size. It is important to keep in mind that the 
average of this variable in the sample, according to Table 4, is substantially smaller 
than 1. Similarly to the analysis of land ownership, column (3) shows that land reform 
has differentiated effects with respect to the household per capita income. There is a 
reduction on the average farm size of the 20 per cent poorest households and an increase 
in landholdings of the others. The decomposition in terms of age does not present a 
clear pattern, while there is also some heterogeneity with respect to the head’s 
schooling.
                                                 
7As in the previous section, it is assumed that log(0)·0=0 in the interpretation of Equation (4) for the sake 
of simplification. 21 
Table 9: Effect of land reform on the size of landholdings 
Dependent variable: log(Area of the household landholdings)      
Panel (i): OLS estimates 
Decomposition of the effect with respect to: 
Without controls  With controls  income age  schooling 
   (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
-0.300*** 0.573***  -0.458***  0.192  0.071  Dummy (positive disappropriation until the 
previous year=1)  (0.077) (0.082)  (0.143)  (0.198)  (0.125) 
     0.876***  0.314  0.482***  Dummy (positive disappropriation) x dummy (2nd 
quintile) 
     (0.207)  (0.252)  (0.186) 
     1.171***  0.397  1.175***  Dummy (positive disappropriation) x dummy (3rd 
quintile) 
     (0.226)  (0.243)  (0.174) 
     1.464***  0.597**    Dummy (positive disappropriation) x dummy (4th 
quintile) 
     (0.233)  (0.245)   
     2.118***  0.452    Dummy (positive disappropriation) x dummy (5th 
quintile) 
      (0.221)  (0.285)    
-0.002 0.075*** -0.029** 0.033*  0.028**  log(disappropriated area per rural household) 
(0.007) (0.008)  (0.014)  (0.019)  (0.012) 
     0.099***  0.031  0.047**  log(disappropriated area per rural household) x 
Dummy (2nd quintile) 
     (0.020)  (0.025)  (0.018) 
     0.123***  0.049**  0.113***  log(disappropriated area per rural household) x 
dummy (3rd quintile) 
     (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.017) 
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     0.147***  0.068***    log(disappropriated area per rural household) x 
dummy (4th quintile) 
     (0.023)  (0.024)   
     0.201***  0.044    log(disappropriated area per rural household) x 
dummy (5th quintile) 
     (0.021)  (0.028)   
Household head, spouse and household 
characteristics 
no yes  yes  yes  yes 
Constant 11.389***  8.424***  8.286***  8.484***  8.466*** 
   (0.016)  (0.197)  (0.200)  (0.209)  (0.200) 
Year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations 52031  35652  35652  35652  35652 
R-squared 0.00  0.27 0.29  0.27  0.28 
Panel (ii): Quantile regressions 
        
   10% 30%  50%  70%  90% 
-0.585*** -0.649***  0.071  1.132***  1.663***  Dummy (positive disappropriation until the 
previous year=1)  (0.099) (0.088)  (0.085)  (0.106)  (0.120) 
-0.034*** -0.041***  0.028***  0.126***  0.174***  log(disappropriated area per rural household) 
(0.009) (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
Household head, spouse and household 
characteristics 
yes yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations 35652  35652  35652  35652  35652 
Notes: Terciles rather than quintiles were considered for the case of years of schooling due to the large proportion of heads with 1 year of schooling or less. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
Source: IBGE, National Household Surveys (PNAD) (various).   23
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Thus, this first set of results suggest that land reform has increased the average size of 
the landholdings, but this effect is not homogeneous with respect to the household per 
capita income—poorer households experienced a reduction while richer households 
experienced an increase on the average farm size. Comparing these results with those of 
Section 4, in which land is highly correlated with income, Table 9 indicates that land 
reform increases the inequality in the distribution of land. In order to address this 
question in a more systematic way, quantile regressions are estimated. The specification   24
presented in Equation (4) is estimated to each decile of the land distribution. Results for 
10, 30, 50, 70 and 90 percentiles are depicted in panel (ii) of Table 9, and the 
coefficients φ  and λ  are plotted in Figures 4 and 5, respectively. 
 
The results suggest that Brazilian land reform have, surprisingly, increased the 
inequality of the land distribution. Land reform has negative effects on holdings with 
size below the median and positive effects on holdings above the median of the land 
distribution. 
8 Conclusion 
Throughout the Brazil’s history, wealth is highly associated with land ownership. In this 
sense, this study looks at the recent Brazilian experience with redistributive land reform 
in order to shed light on its effect on the distribution of wealth in rural areas. After 
presenting the historical determinants of land concentration and the institutional 
background to the land reform in Brazil, the study evaluates the impact of land 
disappropriation on land ownership and land distribution. 
 
Two main conclusions arise from the investigation of the impact of land 
disappropriations on the fraction of the rural families with landholdings. First, land 
reform does not increase land ownership in rural areas, at least from an aggregate 
perspective. Second, the decomposition of this impact according to household income 
and education of the household head reveals important differences. There is an increase 
in landownership among the poorest households and those for which the head has no 
more than one year of schooling. For all other household classes there is a reduction in 
the percentage of landowners. Thus, considering the whole rural population, land reform 
points towards a less unequal distribution of assets, since it increases land ownership 
among poor households and reduces land ownership among rich households.  
 
Interestingly, the analysis of the effect of land reform on the distribution of land among 
landowner households suggests the opposite. Both the quantile regressions and the 
decomposition of the impact according to income indicate an increase in the inequality 
of the holdings. Land reform reduces the size of the holdings of poor families and those 
with smaller tracts of land. Concomitantly, it increases the farm size of rich families and 
those with larger holdings. 
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